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ABSTRAK
Di Malaysia, saham-saham yang baru disenaraikan, pada kebiasaannya, mengalami proses penilaian
harga di bawah paras harga sebenar berbanding dengan harga tawaran di lain-lain pasaran
membangun dan sedang membangun. Hasil kajian ini mendapati purata pulangan luar biasa
untuk hari pertama urusniaga adalah 135 peratus. Hari-hari berikutnya purata pulangan luar
biasa merosot sedikit sebelum meningkat semula iUian "signalling" mendapati risiko ex-ante
boleh menghuraikan paras "underpricing" di Malaysia.
ABSTRACT
Malaysian IPOs are, on average, substantially underpriced compared to underpricing in other
emerging and developed market. The findings of this study suggest that this average abnormal
return on the frist trading day is 135 percent, after which the returns decline slightly in the first
week and gradualy increase thereafter. A test on possible signalling attributes of new issues to
potential investors reveal that of all the suggested determinants, the ex-ante risk factor seems to
explain the level of underpricing.
INTRODUCTION
Initial Public Offers (IPOs) or new issues of
shares refer to the sale of ordinary shares to the
public by previously closely held companies. New
issues are avidly followed by public as short-term
investment in Malaysia as most believe (with good
evidence in the last 15 years) that such issues are
substantially underpriced and would thus provide
large returns at minimum risk. Over-subscription
of most new issues also supports this belief as
well. IPOs tend to be oversubscribed, on average
about 46 times (Dawson 1987; Yong 1991), and
many investors are unable to purchase shares at
the offering price. Most buy from the stock
exchange at the market price. Therefore secondary
market performance is important to investors and
it also sheds light on possible deviations between
offer price and the first day market price.
An increase in the secondary market price
will, for example, indicate that the initial price
is understated. Companies resort to listing in
public exchanges to refinance their expansion
and to obtain less costly sources of new funds.
When owners of a company have a considerable
amount of wealth invested in the enterprise, and
are interested to diversify their portfolios to add
liquidity to their investments, they usually go
public. Listing is a prelude to a longer-term
push for expansion using the funds generated
by IPO and then via rights and debt issues.
However, the motive for seeking efficient source
of financing through IPO is to take advantage of
positive net present value investment
opportunities by committing funds from new
issues as real future investments.
The process of listing is quite involved in
the emerging Malaysian market compared with
developed markets. The Malaysian IPOs are
authenticated by the Securities Commission,
which examines and approves listing applications.
The proposed issue price of the issuing company
as determined by merchant bank(s) are often
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varied by the approving authorities. 0
prospectus of any kinds is issued before all the
approvals are in, following which public
announcement is made for inviting applications
with prepayments. Balloting and allocation of
share are vetted by either one of available two
issuing houses and listing is usually done a month
after close of application. Only investors who
bought shares at the offer price earn substantial
returns over their investment. Second, the
market may initially overprice the IPOs in the
midst of public enthusiasm based on widespread
belief of underpricing and over-subscription.
Subsequently, the market corrects the
overreaction and the market price will adjust
downward to its true intrinsic value.
Third, the initial price increase in IPOs will
be followed by a continuing price rise, which
implies that the initial price increase does not
fully reflect the amount of underpricing. An
explanation for this behaviour is that
underpricing creates demand for share which is
self-generating. This view contradicts the efficient
market hypothesis.
In Malaysia, Dawson (1987) reported positive
initial gross returns of 166 percent on 21 New
issues for the period 1978 to 1983. These returns
declined over time, although price changes were
still positive and increased at a smaller rate than
the initial pricing. A more recent study by Yong
(1991) on the behaviour of 33 new issues in
Malaysia for the period 1983 to 1988 shows that
the average return at the end of the first trading
day is 167 percent but declines over time,
consistent with Dawson's (1987) findings.
This study expands the previous IPO studies
on the Malaysian market in terms of longer time
period (1975 to 1996), larger sample size (100
firms) and document not only the short and
long-run performance ofIPO's but also examines
the validity of Grinblatt-Hwang (1989) Signalling
Model in the Malaysian IPO market.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Considerable research findings on pricing of
IPOs in the developed (US, UK and Australia)
and developing markets suggest an apparent
underpricing. A summary of these studies is
presen ted in Table 1.
It is reported that abnormal returns on day
one are caused by investment banker's
underpricing. Ibbotson (1975), Ibbotson et al.
TABLE I
Summary of research findings on IPOs in developed and developing markets
Deveoped
Market
US
Ibbotson (1975)
McDonald and Fischer (1972)
Ritter (1984)
UK
Buck, Herbert and Yeomens (1981)
Austmlia
Finn and Higham (1983)
Developing Markets
Year of Number of Issues Percentage
Study Studied Underpricing
1960-69 120 12.8
1969-70 148 28.5
1977-82 1028 26.5
1965-75 297 9.7
1965-88 93 23
Malaysia
Dawson (1987)
Yong (1991)
Singapore
Dawson (1985)
Koh, Loke, Phoon and Lim (1989)
1978-84
1983-88
1978-84
1987-88
21
33
29
9
166
167
37.5
30.82
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(1988) have documented that new issues are
riskier than the average share in the market.
Investment bankers therefore will try to reduce
their risk and costs of underwriting by
underpricing the issue. The persistent evidence
of underpricing might also be due to the
uncertainty about the real value of shares and
the related need to offer investors compensation
for assuming higher risk. However, Aggarwal
and Ritter (1990) suggest that shares are issued
at their instlinsic values and the prices are bid
up by an overly optimistic market.
Baron (1982) assumes that investment
bankers are bettel' informed about investors
demand for new issues, and therefore in most
cases the issuing company delegates the pricing
decision to them. However, the issuer
compensates the banker for the use of his superior
information by allowing the banker to offer new
issues at a discount from the expected price after
listing. Baron suggests that the discount is an
increasing function of the issues' uncertainty about
the market demand for new issues.
Rock (1986) explains the underpricing of
IPOs using asymmetric information hypothesis.
Rock suggests that the asymmetl), of information
is not between the issuer and their investment
banker but between two groups of potential
investors in the market: informed investors and
uninformed investors. Rock posits that
underpricing exits to lure uninformed investors
who are uncertain about the value of the shares
in the market and end up buying more of the
overpriced issues and less of the underpriced
issues compared to informed investors.
Overtime, uninformed investors learn to
anticipate this adverse selection and only bid if
the offer price is far below their expected market
price to compensate them for the expected losses
of overpriced issues.
Underpricing of IPOs is also used as a
signal of quality by firms with superior prospects.
These firms signalled their expected good
fortunes to the investors using a low IPO price
and thus underprice the initial offering and
make initial owners absorbed these "losses".
This underpricing is a signal to investors that
the issuer is a good performer and expects to
cover the loss after their performance is realised.
Good firms find it worthwhile to underprice
their IPOs because it conditions investors to
more favourably interpret subsequent financial
results.
The speculative-bubble hypothesis also
explains the excess returns of the IPO's. The
speculative investors who could not get
allocations of the oversubscribed new issues from
the underwriters at the offering price or received
fewer shares than they wanted will purchase
additional shares after the secondary market
trading begins. These purchases create a demand
pressure after listing overprice new issues
temporarily. This hypothesis implies that the
initial positive excess returns of the IPOs should
be followed by negative excess returns as the
bubble bursts.
The Signalling Process of [POs Using Grinblatt -
Hwang Model
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) developed a two-
signals model (hereafter referred as GH) to
explain the information asymmetry between the
issuer who has better knowledge about the true
value of his firm and outside investors who are
uninformed. Firm value is assumed to be
described by its future cashflows which may be
measured by the expected value of cashflows
(mean) and the dispersion of cashflows
(variance). The two signals are needed to convey
the firm's value because both mean and variance
of the firm's cashflows are unknown. In the
context of Leyland and Pyle's (1976) paper, the
issuer signals the true value of the firm by
retaining a proportion of the new issue, a, as the
proportion of the equity to be retained, where a
is > O. Intuitively, it may be reasoned that by
retaining a higher proportion of the total share
capital, the issuer forgoes the diversification of
his personal portfolio and thereby incurs
signalling costs. Therefore, he will retain a
significant ownership interest only if he expects
the future cashflows to be high relative to current
firm value, so rational investors will see the
fraction of equity retained by the issuer as a
signal of firm value. In a class of issuers with the
same firm risk, a high-value firm is motivated to
signal itself vis-a.-vis a low-value firm by retaining
a greater fraction of the total share capital. The
marginal costs of signalling is lower for high-
value firm and studies by Downes and Heinkel
(1982) and Koh, Lake, Phoon and Lim (1989)
corroborate this.
The second hyopothesis proposed by
Grinblatt-Hwang model is that there is a positive
relationship between the degree of underpricing
and the level of ex ante uncertainty (proxied by
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variance of returns) faced by investors. Beatty
and Ritter (1984) and Rock (1986) provided
evidence supporting this hypothesis.
Hwang (1988) has also suggested that high-
value firms underprice their shares more than
low-value firms knowing that they can recover
what they give away at the IPOs when the true
value of the firm is revealed after the issue date.
DATA ANp METHODOLOGY
One hundred IPOs of Malaysian incorporated
companies from the Industrial, Finance,
Properties, Plan tation and Tin sectors were
chosen for the period 1980-1994. This allowed
for the analysis of each IPO performance until
1996. Various issues of the Investors Digest,
Daily Diary, and the company files from the
Registrar of Companies were accessed for the
required information. For each issue, the offer
price and prices for the first day of trading, first
week of trading, first month of trading, third
month of trading, sixth month of trading and so
on until the thirty-sixth month of trading are
accumulated. The capitalisation and dividend
adjusted price relative monthly data are used to
calculate the rates of return for each issue. The
New Straits Times (NST) Industrial Index is
selected as the index of market performance
because the industrial sector accounts more than
two-thirds of the sample and more than 50% of
market capitalisation of the Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange (KLSE).
The effect of IPOs on the investors' wealth
is estimated by computing holding period
returns. An event study methodology is applied,
with the listing date as day zero in event time. A
period of 36 months after listing date is chosen
to ascertain the long-run performance of the
IPOs. The first day excess return, the short-run
(up to 6 months) and long-run excess returns
(from 7 to 36 months) are computed for each
IPO. The first day return is computed by dividing
the difference between closing price of the first
trading day and the offer price with the offer
price. This will proxy the degree of underpricing,
D.
The event-study approach is well suited to
address underpricing issue. The market-adjusted
abnormal returns (AR) of each share (1=1, ... N)
were calculated for different time periods using
market returns from share market indices. The
risk-adjustment procedure using market model
risk parameters and market returns were not
applied because of lack of historical time series
of returns for new issues pl-ior to their listing.
Furthermore, Ariff and Johnson (1990) reports
the relative superiority of market-adjustment
procedure for calculating abnormal returns in
the thinly-traded market where risk-adjustment
made little difference.
AR = L[(Ri - E(R)]
N
where
AR : adjusted average returns
N : the number of firms i = 1. ..N
analysed
Ri : rates of return of firm i at
event time; and
E(R) : expected returns generated
in two ways as described.
Multiple regression and correlation analyses
are carried out to investigate the relationships
proposed by the signalling hypothesis. The
firm risk, 0-2 , is proxied by the variance of the
daily returns after listing. Firms size (FS) is
measured by the product of the total number
of shares outstanding and the offer price. The
change in firm value, (L'.FV), is the percentage
change in market capitalisation scaled by the
ratio of the market index at the offer date and
the listing date. Specifically, the change in
firm value is computed by adjusting the
percentage change in the market capitalisation
between the offer date and the listing date by
the change in the market index. The fractional
holding of the issuer (or the insider
shareholding), ex is measured by the number of
shares retained by the issuer divided by the
total number of shares outstanding at the issue
date.
HYPOTHESES TESTED
The following hypotheses on the performance
and the signalling process of Malaysian IPOs are
evaluated:
HI The average first-day abnormal returns
for the IPOs is positive.
H 2 The abnormal returns after listing are
small and insignificant.
H s The value of the firm is positively related
to the fractional holding of the issuer
(ex), holding the 0-2 variance constant.
H 4 The degree of underpricing (D) is an
increasing function of the variance,
given the issuer's fractional holdings.
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ii) Post Listing Performance of IPOs
a) Short-run performance
TABLE 2
Percentage abnormal returns of Malaysian IPOs
on the first day of trading: 1980-1996
TABLE 3
Short-run underpricing of Malaysian 1POs
relative to the offer prices
H
5
: The firm value is positively related to
the degree of underpricing (D), given
the issuer's fractional holdings (a).
TABLE 4
Long-run underpricing of Malaysian IPOs relative
to offer prices
b) Long-run Performance
Long-run performance refers to the price
performance of IPOs from the seventh to the
thirty-sixth month of trading. Table 4
summarises the average abnormal returns in
the long-run. The average abnormal returns
at the end of the seventh month to the first
year is 133 percent, at the end of the second
year is 94 percent and at the end of the third
year is 77 percent. The average abnormal
returns in the long-run are almost half of
those in the short-run, consistent with the
demand pressure hypothesis. The findings
imply that the long-term performance of
new issues is positive and significant, incon-
sistent with the findings of Finn and Higham
(1983) .
the first day, an average of 135 percent of
abnormal returns were observed. At the end
of first week of trading, the public offers
recorded are 122 percent abnormal returns.
There is a slight decline compared to the
first day of trading, possibly due to profit
taking activities of investors who cash in their
new issues. After the first week, there is a
slight upward trend in the abnormal returns
at the end of first month (128%), third month
(129%) and sixth month (133%). Generally,
the IPOs showed a significant abnormal
returns at the end of the first trading day
which declines slightly at the end of first
week and recovers at the end of the sixth
month. These findings support the first
hypothesis. This implies that most IPOs are
inefficiently priced at their intrinsic value
and the optimistic expectations of investors
cannot completely explain the large abnormal
returns observed at the end of the first trading
day.
135
III
0.82
4.7
563
Mean
Std. Deviation
Coefficient of variation
Minimum
Maximum
First First First 3-Months 6-Months
Day Week Month
135% 122% 128% 129% 133%
(t=8.67) * (t=8.91)* (t=9.52)* (t=8.36) * (t=9.33)*
Table 2 summarises the average first day
market-adjusted abnormal returns of new issues.
The first day return is 135 percent, with a
minimum of 4.7 percent and maximum 563
percent and a volatility of III percent. The
high degree of underpricing is consistent with
previous documented evidence. This finding
supports HI' that the first-day underpricing is
significantly larger than normal. However, it is
possible that the shares of IPOs are issued at
their intrinsic values and these prices are bid up
by demand pressure in an optimistic market.
This is ascertained by analysing the longer term
performance.
FINDINGS
Short and Long-run performance of IPOs
i) First day performance of IPOs
*significant underpricing at or better than 0.05 probability
levels
The short-run performance refers to the
price performance of IPOs from the close of the
first trading day to six months after listing. Table
3 summarises the average abnormal returns
up to six months of trading. At the end of
7th month 2-year 3-year
to 1 year
133% 94% 77%
(t=8.18)* (t=6.00) (t=4.7)*
*significant underpricing at or better than 0.05
probability levels.
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Variables
Underpricing
Insider70%
Shareholdings
Firm size
Issue size*
Sample size = 100
Annuar M.N. and Shamsher M.
Table 5
Summary Statistics
Mean Std Dev. Min Max
132% 133% -2% 569%
11% 0% 89%
RM77.6m RM66.3m RM5m RM1200m
RM17.96 RM14.56m RM2.4 RM203.9m
*Issue size refers to the size of IPQ defined as the total number of shares offered to the public multiplied
by the offer price
The Signalling Process of IPOs
Table 5 provides summary statlstlcs of the
sampled firms with regard to the variables of the
signalling process. The average underpricing is
135 percent and average amount of retained
equity is 70 percent, which ranges from zero to
eighty nine percent.
To examine the testable implications of the
GH model, correlation and multiple regression
analysis were used and the findings are presented
in tables 6 and 7 respectively. Table 6 shows
that there is statistically significant positive
correlation between firm risk, 0'2, and degree of
underpricing, D. There is also a significant
positive correlation between firm risk, 0'2, and
change in firm value, ~ FV. There is a positive
but not significant correlation between level of
insider shareholding (ex) and change in firm
value (~ FV). These relationships are further
supported by results of the regression analysis.
Note: p-value in parentheses
TABLE 6
Correlation coefficient Matrix
ex D cr2 FS ~FV
ex 1.00
D 0.30 1.00
(4.15)**
cr2 0.24 0.93 1.00
(2.56) (268.89) *
FS 0.20 0.15 0.08 1.00
(1.75) (0.968) (0.271)
~FV 0.23 0.83 0.70 -0.04 1.00
(2.45) (93.00) * (0.067)
ote: F-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 1% level
**significant at 5% level
Table 7 shows a set of three regression
results. In regression 1, the change in firm
value is negatively related to the level of insider
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shareholdings, when firm size is controlled.
However, the relationship is not statistically
significant (coefficient = -0.142, p-value = -0.780).
These findings are inconsistent with the
prediction of the GH model which suggests that
insider shareholdings signal firm value.
Regression 2 shows when firm size is
controlled, firm risk is a good explanatory
variable for the degree of underpricing
(coefficient = 0.141, p-value = 0.000). There is
no statistical relationship between the degree of
underpricing and level of insider shareholdings
(coefficient = 0.716, p-value =0.086) at 5 percent
level, which is consistent with the prediction of
the GH model.
In the third regression, when the level of
insider shareholdings is controlled (which is
also predicted to be related to firm value), the
change in firm value is an increasing function of
degree of underpricing (coefficient = 1.117, p-
value = 0.000). Although the results of the
correlation and regression analysis support two
of the three testable implications of the GH
model, the change in firm values are estimated
from the change in values between two discrete
points in time. Therefore, an analysis of
abnormal returns of the sampled firm over the
sampled period using even-study methodology
was carried out to substantiate the above analysis.
To examine the abnormal returns of the
sampled firms beyond the listing date, the sample
was partitioned into groups based on the level of
insider shareholdings and the degree of
underpricing. The number of grouping was
determined based on the distribution of the
variables.
For the sample based on insider
shareholdings, 35 IPOs were in the average
category, 30 in the high and 35 in the low
category respectively. The findings presented in
Table 8 show that none of the abnormal returns
in the three categories of insider shareholding
are statistically significant, consistent with the
results of the regression analysis and inconsistent
with the prediction of the GH model.
For the grouping based on degree of
underpricing, 25 IPOs in total were categorised in
the very high and high categories respectively, 25
in the average categories and 50 in the low category.
The findings summarised in Table 9 show that
only the average abnormal returns for the law
category are statistically significant over the three
years period. These findings are anomalous to the
prediction of the GH model but are consistent
with the findings on the Singapore market (Koh,
Loke, Phoon and Lim 1989).
CONCLUSION
The short and long-run performance and the
signalling process of a sample of 100 Malaysian
IPOs were examined. The findings suggest that
the average abnormal return on the first trading
day is 135 percent, after which the returns decline
slightly in the first week and gradually increase
thereafter. The long-run returns decline
gradually to about 43 percent of the first day
returns but is positive and statistically significant.
Those investors who received the new issue from
the issuing firm earn and average abnormal
returns of 133 percent after one year and the
returns decline to 77 percent after 3 years. This
TABLE 8
Average daily market-adjusted return for IPOs
in the post-listing-categorised by a, the insider shareholdings
Category Average daily market adjusted returns
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
High
(80 < a < 89) -0.279% -0.21 % -0.302%
(-0.585) (-0.042) (-0.0312)
Average
(70 < a < 79) 0.263% 0.83% 0.195%
(1.054) (0.372) (0.276)
Low
(0 < a < 69) 0.034% 0.146% 0.123%
(0.121) (0.196) (0.178)
Note: t-statistics in the parentheses
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TABLE 9
Average daily market-adjusted return for IPOs
in the post-listing period. categorised by D, the degree of underpicing
Category Average daily market adjusted returns
~Ml ~M2 ~M3
1. Very high underpricing
(D> 100%) -0.593% -0.716% -1.033%
(-0.708) (-1.020) (-1.061)
2. High underpricing
(51 % < D < 100%) -0.321 -0.467 -0.500
(-0.883) (-0.835) (-0.770)
3. Average underpricing
(31% < D < 51%) -0.224 -0.191 -0.428
(0.845) (-0.549) (-1.40)
4. Low underpricing
(0 < D < 30%) 0.558 0.451 0.549
(3.189)* (1.854) ** (2.119) **
Note: t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
suggests that, on average, the IPOs are either
substan tially underpriced or there are other
factors not accounted for that sustain the
underpricing on the long-term basis. The first
reasoning is plausible because even if the IPOs
are substantially underpriced, the market would
eventually price the issue fairly through the
arbitrage process in a very short span of time. It
is highly likely that the sustained underpricing
of Malaysian IPOs is due to the economic policy
of the government which requires at least 30
percent of each tranche of new issues to be
allocated to designated group of investors or
institutions owned by them, in view to correct
the imbalance in the investment capital
ownership among the different ethnic groups of
the population. The offer price is usually
intentionally fixed at a level that will ensure a
benefit to those allocated the shares because the
listed price is usually highly fuelled by the
demand pressure. A moratorium is usually
imposed on these groups not to sell the shares
immediately for short-term gains, which could
explain the long-term positive returns on these
shares.
For the signalling process of IPOs only two
of the three testable implications of the Grinblatt-
Hwang Model are supported. The regression
and correlation analysis showed that there is a
significant positive relationship between firm risk
and level of underpricing and change in firm
value and underpricing. However, the results of
the abnormal returns analysis are inconsistent
with the prediction of the model. In general, the
Grinblatt-Hwang Signalling Process Model does
not fully hold for the sample of Malaysian IPOs.
This could be due to the difference in the market
structure and sophistication of investors, who do
not perceive the implication of certain factors in
a similar manner as those in developed market
where the model was developed. This suggests
that the model requires some refinements
involving the attributes of an emerging stock
market and less sophisticated investors.
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